Column one is just a replication of the results of the full benchmark model from
Table 3 which we present here for the convenience of the reader. The results presented
in column two, however, indicate that increasing the bank-level pricing power - that is,
increasing the Lerner Index - no longer has a risk-reducing effect when concentrating
on the probability of a distress merger or a moratorium (i.e., focusing the analysis on
actual bank defaults). The same holds for the Boone Indicator. While more competitive
behavior in the (more broadly defined) banking market, i.e. a lower Boone Indicator, has a
risk-alleviating effect in the benchmark regression, the Boone Indicator has no significant
effect on the default probability of banks. In this regression, the sign of the variable
Regional Geographical Reach changes, too, indicating that a higher market share
of bank branches reduced the probability of a bank default (even when it does positively
affect weaker forms of bank distress, as shown in the baseline regressions in Table 3).